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KNOWING NUMBERS 
Simple arithmetic entails that there are numbers, two of them between 3 and 6, for example, and infinitely many thereafter. But how do we know that there are any such things? If num- 
bers exist, they would surely be abstract, and there seems to be no way 
of explaining our knowledge of abstract objects, short of postulating 
some supernatural mode of apprehending them. Numbers in partic- 
ular do not emit or reflect signals, they leave no traces, their behavior 
causes no phenomena from which their existence may be inferred. 
Although it is plausible that arithmetic is indispensable to empirical 
science, this has been disputed; and even if true, its significance for 
the truth of arithmetic and the existence of numbers is moot, as one 
might take an instrumentalist view of arithmetic in science.l Consid- 
erations of this sort have led some people to conclude that we do not 
have knowledge of numbers, and to seek to accommodate the prev- 
alence and utility of arithmetic in one way or another within a 
nominalist framework. 
'Hartry Field has argued against the claim that arithmetic is indispensable to 
science-Science zuithozct ,Vzcmbers (Princeton: University Press, 1980). Some accept 
the claim but dispute its epistemological significance: Penelope Maddy, "Indispens- 
ability and Practice," this JOL~RNAI., LXXXIX,6 (June 1992): 275-89; and Elliott 
Sober, "Mathematics and Indispensability," Philosophical Review, CII (1993): 35-57. 
Michael Resnik defends both the claim and its significance-12lathernatics as a Scierlce 
of Patterns (New York: Oxford, 1997). The indispensability criterion is stated in 
Hilary Putnam, "Mathematics without Foundations," in Mathenlatics, 12lnttel; and 
ivethod: Pl~ilosophical Pafiers, \'olume I (New York: Cambridge, 1967). Putnam at- 
tributes the criterion to W. \'. Quine. 
0022-362X/01/9801/5-18 O 2001 The Journal of Philosophy, Inc. 
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Nominalism is the view that there are no abstract en ti tie^.^ Nomi-
nalism about arithmetic is the view that either numbers are not 
abstract, or arithmetical sentences, correctly interpreted, do not en- 
tail the existence of numbers, or arithmetic is false. Of these three 
brands of nominalism, the first is not popular3 and so I shall say 110 
more about it. The task for the second brand is to find a plausible 
interpretation of arithmetic that maintains truth and avoids commit- 
ment to abstract en ti tie^.^ A route favored recently is to go modal: 
interpret arithmetical statements as about possibilities or possible 
concrete objects. A common feature of these attempts is that under 
the chosen interpretation, the proposition expressed by an arithmet- 
ical sentence differs from anything we have in mind when using the 
sentence.j So this brand of nominalism is prima facie implausible, 
and it leaves open the question of the truth of the propositions we 
actually have in mind when using arithmetical sentences. 
The third brand of nominalism about arithmetic is fictionalism. 
According to fictionalism, arithmetical sentences say just what we 
normally think they say, and our arithmetical theorems have the 
existential consequences we normally think they have; but arithmet- 
ical theorems with existential consequences are one and all false.6 
There are infinitely many primes? False! 2 + 1 = 3? False! This is 
uncomfortable. Simple numerical equations are among the proposi- 
tions that seem most obviously true. There are various emollients to 
alleviate discomfort: arithmetic does not have to be true to be useful, 
and we can specify a kind of correctness without appeal to truth: 
'What this comes to is not clear, as the abstract-concrete distinction is hazy. But 
it is widely assumed that numbers would have to be abstract. For the difficulty of 
drawing the abstract-concrete distinction, see Bob Hale, Abstract Objects (Cambridge: 
Blackwell, 1987), chapter 3. 
The only one I know of who might qualify as a nominalist of this kind is Bishop 
Berkeley, who claimed that "numbers are nothing but names"-Plzilosophical Com-
~nentarir~s(NewYork: Garland, 1989), § 763, cf. # 803. It is not clear what he would 
have said about numbers beyond those for which a name has been uttered or 
written down. 
"This is dubbed "the hermeneutic strategy" in John P. Burgess and Gideon 
Rosen, A Sz~tject with No Object (New York: Oxford, 1997). 
For example, on one ilominalist iilterpretatioil of arithmetic, an  arithmetical 
sentence S is to be understood roughly as follo~vs: there could be a model of the 
second-order Dedekind-Peano axioms for arithmetic and necessarily, for ally model 
1\/1of those axioms, S is true in iM.Clearly, only someone with some knowledge of 
mathematical logic would even entertain a thought of this kind. For details, see 
Geoffrey Hellman, ~Zlnthematics without Nutithers: Toruards a ~VIodal-Structz~ml Interpre-
tation (New York: Oxford, 1989). For an alternative ilolninalist view, see Charles 
Chihara, Constructibility and ~\/lathemntical Existence (New York: Oxford, 1990). 
"ee Field; and David Papineau, "Ihowledge of Mathematical Objects," in A. D. 
Irvine, ed., Physicalisnl in  !Mathev~atics (Boston: IUuwer, 1989), pp. 15481. 
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derivability from axioms. Moreover, there are various reconstructive 
strategies7 for finding a nominalistic statement capturing "the grain 
of truth" in a theorem of arithmetic. But this satisfies only a lucky few. 
Surely, some misunderstanding is involved in disbelieving that 2 + 
1 = 3, for example? Thus we may be trapped, stuck at one or another 
unsatisfactory position or oscillating between them. 
The aim here is to show that this trap is avoidable, by arguing for 
the possibility of a naturalistic account of knowing numbers, without 
taking them to be concrete objects. I shall try to show that cognitive 
science already provides some of the resources for such an account. 
The numbers I have in mind are the finite cardinals: some we know 
by acquaintance and some by description. The paper takes these 
cases in order, and then something is said about knowing finite 
numbers more abstract than cardinals. But first I want to say what 
cardinal numbers are, and to present a general setting for the epis- 
temology to follow. 
I. WHAT ARE CARDINAL NUMBERS? 
Cardinal numbers are properties. In my view, they are properties of 
sets, but they might also be properties of concept extensions, collec- 
tions, pluralities, nonmereological aggregates, or some other kind of 
collective, provided that collectives of one or zero items are not 
excluded. I shall talk of sets for convenience, but I do not insist that 
only sets have cardinal number. As long as one is clear about which 
are the items in the collective to be numbered, one need not deploy 
a general collective concept in framing the question: What is the 
number of sheep in this flock? In fact, one can do without any 
collective concept, general or specific: How many sheep are here? 
Nonetheless, the answer to the question gives the cardinal size of the 
flock, and that is as much a property of the flock as its monetaly value 
or the average age of its members. 
But do any properties exist? Are properties and kinds not just a 
philosopher's fiction, or the result of a mistakenly literal reading of 
certain fa~ons de pnrler? This view was famously expressed by W. V. 
Quine8: 
One  may admit that there are red houses, roses and sunsets, but deny, 
except as a popular and misleading way of speaking, that they have 
anything in common. ...[T]he  word 'red'  o r  'red object' is true of each 
of sundiy individual entities which are red houses, red roses, red sunsets; 
Burgess and Rose11 sui-vey the recollstructive strategies. 
"On What There Is," in his From A Logical Point of Vzmu (Cambridge: Haward, 
1933), pp. 1-19. 
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but there is not, in addition, any entity whatever, individual o r  othei~vise, 
which is named by the word 'redness', nor, for that matter, by the word 
'househood', 'rosehood', 'sunsethood' (ibid., p. 10). 
Platog may have thought that for evely general term there is a 
corresponding Form. Quine held that for no general term is there a 
corresponding property or kind. Between these two extremes lies the 
"mixed" view that for some but not all general terms does there exist 
a corresponding property or kind. Although there is no decisive 
argument for any of these views, I hold that the mixed view should be 
our default hypothesis. It is true that we rarely assert or deny the 
existence of a property or kind, as opposed to instances of a property 
or kind. But although talk of this kind is rare, judgments about the 
existence or nonexistence of properties and kinds are sometimes 
made in science. For example, Joseph Priestley thought that all 
combustible material contained phlogiston, a substance that is liber- 
ated from the material in combustion, with the dephlogisticated 
substance left as an ash or residue. Antoine Lavoisier thought that 
there was no such substance as phlogiston and no such property as 
being dephlogisticated. 
Is this really a case of a difference about the existence of a kind or 
property, rather than about the existence of instances? Of course, 
they did disagree about the existence of instances. But there was 
more to it than that. On Lavoisier's view, nothing could contain 
phlogiston or be dephlogisticated. Compare this with the case of a 
transuranium element prior to evidence that there exist any atoms of 
that element. Before 1996, no sample of the element with atomic 
number 112 had been found and, as far as was known, there was none 
in existence. Yet it was held that there could be some, and in fact 
some was produced (by bombarding lead with zinc). This is the 
current situation for the element with atomic number 114.1° Thus, 
scientists view the following as an epistemic possibility: there is no 
sample of element 114 but some could be produced. Although it is 
also believed that there is no sample of phlogiston, it is not also 
believed that some could be produced. What explains the difference? 
Surely, it is not that present technology for producing phlogiston lags 
behind present technology for producing superheavy elements, nor 
even that there is an insuperable technological barrier, such as an 
T h e  Republic, G. M .  A. Grube, trans. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992) 596a. X 
co7resfionds to general term Twhen Xis designated by the singular term formed from 
T (for example, T-ness, 01- in Plato's writing, the T itself). 
lo By the time you read this, the claim may be out of date, but the philosophical 
point is unaffected. 
- - 
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unattainable energy requirement, to phlogiston production. The 
answer is that while there is such a kind as element with atomic 
number 114 and such a property as having a nucleus with 114 
protons, there is no such kind as phlogiston and no such property as 
being phlogiston. 
Are we being misled by popular ways of speaking here? Presum- 
ably, we have a naive linguistic disposition to generalize existentially 
on a noun phrase, and the idea that kinds and properties exist might 
be nothing but an unconscious conversion of this disposition into an 
ontological thesis, regardless of empirical justification. But in hold- 
ing the mixed view (that some noun phrases for properties or kinds 
do designate while others do not), we clearly resist that disposition. 
On the mixed view, decisions about what kinds and properties are 
real is to be based on empirical findings. The extreme views, by 
contrast, issue from metaphysical prejudice, as they are unlikely to be 
accepted by anyone without a platonist or a nominalist bent.ll For 
these reasons, I am going to take the mixed view as the default 
position and use it as a background premise. That of course leaves 
open the question whether there are such properties as cardinal 
numbers. The affirmative view is not confined to those with a general 
predisposition to platonism. John Locke,12 for example, included 
number in the list of what he was prepared to call "real qualities." But 
this view needs vindicating. The challenge is to show how, if there 
were cardinal number properties, we could have knowledge of them. 
I shall tly to meet that challenge in what follows by sketching a 
naturalistic account of such knowledge. 
11. ACQUAINTANCE WITH CARDINAL NUMBERS 
We say that we knowJohn Doe, but for entities other than people, talk 
of knowing them is unusual and sometimes odd. But not always: on 
hearing the opening bars of a symphony, one might say 'I know that 
music'; on seeing the handwritten address on an envelope, one might 
say 'I know that handwriting'. Here one claims to recognize the 
"At the time Q ~ ~ i n e  (reluctant)wrote "On What There Is," he was not the 
Platonist that he later became. That article was first published in 1948, a year after 
the publication of "Steps towards a Constructive Nominalism," Journal of SynDolic 
Logic, XII (1947): 105-22, co-authored with Nelson Goodman. In that article they 
declare their belief in the nonexistence of abstracta to be a "philosophical intuition 
that cannot be justified by appeal to anything more fundamental" (p.  105). 
' V n  Essay Concerning Human Understanding [I6891 (New York: Oxford, 1975), 
Book 11, Chapter VIII, § 17. One  might argue that what Locke really had in mind 
here is not the number n but the property of having n atomic collstituellts 
("solid parts"). But this reading of the passage is dubious and cannot easily be 
transferred to other passages in which Locke seems to say that number is a 
prirnar) quality. 
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music or handwriting, and if the claim is true one must be acquainted 
with it.13 In these cases, acquaintance entails that one has already 
heard performances or seen samples, and from this prior experience 
one has acquired a concept of the music or handwriting, and an 
ability to recognize the music or handwriting in other performances 
or samples, where this involves thinking of them under a relevant 
concept. Generalizing, I shall take it as sufficient for acquaintance 
with a property that one has experienced instances of it, and as a 
result one has acquired a concept of the property and an ability to 
recognize other instances and to discriminate them from nonin- 
stances (unless circumstances are unfavorable), where this involves 
applying the concept exclusively to the instances.14 
M'hat does recognitional ability consist in when the property con- 
cerned is a cardinal number? It is not enough to be able to tell 
whether a given set has the cardinality. By caref~ll counting, we can 
tell whether a given set of stationary visible objects whose cardinality 
lies somewhere in the 200-to-300 range has cardinality 271. That 
would be mere detection rather than recognition. ~ecognit ion of n 
requires that we have some sense of the cardinal size n as distinct 
from its neighbors. For which cardinals do we have such a sense? 
There is evidence that we have an innately given magnitude repre- 
sentation of rough cardinal size, or numerosity, with a neural basis in 
the inferior parietal 1obes.l"he evidence comes from a variety of 
sources: experiments on healthy adults and children, clinical tests on 
brain-damaged patients, brain-imaging techniques, and studies on 
animals from parrots to primates.'"he capacity for representing 
numerosities shares a couple of features with other innate rough- 
quantity senses, such as sense of duration, temperature, and pitch. 
These features are known as the distance effect and the map i t u d e  effect. 
Crudely put, the distance effect is that the smaller the difference 
I 3  I take it as obvious that one would not be claiming to know that very perfor- 
mance of the symphony or  those very ink marks on the envelope. \Illat one claims 
to know is the type rather than any of its tokens. 
ailonymous referee points out that this account of property acquaintance 
sounds perfectly acceptable to an antirealist about properties who favors concep- 
tualism. While this may be true, it is not in coilflict with my aim at this point, which 
is to argue that, if there were cardinal-number properties, we could have knowledge 
of them. My reason for taking seriously talk of properties is given in the previous 
section. 
l5This is what Stanislas Dehaene refers to by the title phrase of his book: The 
Nz~nlber Sense (New York: Oxford, 1997). 
'"ee Brian Buttei~vorth, The ~Zlathematical Brain (London: Macmillan, 1999), 
chapters 3-6. This was published in the United States as JVltat Counts: Hozu Every 
Brain Is Hardzuired for Math (New York: Free Press, 1999). See also Dehaene, 
chapters 1-3, 7, 8. 
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between two quantities (for a fixed mean), the harder it is to distin- 
guish them; the magnitude effect is that the greater the mean of two 
quantities (for a fixed difference) the harder it is to distinguish 
them.17 Difficulty of discrimination is measured by response times 
and error rates for tasks requiring comparison of the quantities. The 
pattern of response times and error rates is part of the data to be 
explained; the fact that this pattern is the signature of rough-quality 
sensing supports the view that in making nulnber judgments of the 
kinds, tested subjects are sensing rough qualities.ls Putting together 
the distance effect and the magnitude effect, it follows that in using 
our sense of numerosity to distinguish adjacent numbers, it will be 
easier for small numbers; and this is how it seems to be. There is 
evidence from studies with very young children and animals for a 
prelinguistic ability to discriminate cardinal numbers 1,2,  and 3. This 
ability may be provided by our numerosity sense, something that is 
predicted by a neural network model for this sense.l"his prelin-
guistic ability is matched by an extremely fast and reliable ability in 
adults to sense the cardinal numbers of sets of 1, 2,  and 3 visually 
presented items, known as s u b i t i ~ i n g ~ ~So we can sense these cardinal 
numbers, and once we have concepts for these cardinal numbers, we 
can recognize instances of them and discriminate them from nonin- 
"For precise statements of these features, see any textbook in psychophysics 
under "Fechner's Law" and "bt'eber's Law." 
l8 Thus it is a mistake to think that the only data we have are data to the effect that 
we know facts of the form 'There are n so-and-sos' for small n. This, I hope, partly 
answers the question of an anonymous referee how such data justify the claim that 
we know numbers as objects. In fact, I do  not want to claim that we know numbers 
as objects, and if some formulations suggest othes~vise, please regard that as a slip. 
My claim is that a ilaturalistic account of knowledge of numbers is not impossible 
if we take cardinal numbers to be properties. 
I9 Dehaene and Jean-Pierre Changeux, "Development of Elementary Numerical 
Abilities: A Neuronal Model," journccl of Cognitive Nezcrosciencc v (1993): 390-407. 
The hypothesis that the numerical abilities of animals and infants are based on a 
sense of numerosity is put fos~vard by Dehaene in The Number Sense among others. 
This is disputed in Susan Carey, "Evolutionas-y and Ontogenetic Fouildations of 
Arithmetic," &find and Language (forthcoming). Carey's view is that we have the 
sense of numerosity but that performance of numerical tasks by animals and infants 
uses other cogilitive resources. 
20 S~~bjectsare asked to indicate the number of presented items flashed on a 
screen as quickly as they can. When response time is plotted as ofa f~~i lc t ion 
number of items viewed, there is a discontinuity in slope: almost horizontal for small 
numbers (too fast for silent counting), steeper for larger numbers (matching 
increments in counting time). Error rates show the same pattern. The discontinuity 
persists under diverse display conditions. This is evidence for different processes of 
enumeration: a fast, error-free process for small numbers, that is, subitizing, and a 
slower, less reliable process for larger numbers. (The subitizing limit varies between 
3 and 7, depending on type of experiment, visual display, statistical techniques used 
to calculate subitizing limit, and individual differences.) 
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stances (in particular, from instances of adjacent cardinal numbers), 
as we do in subitizing. 
MThat kind of experiences would help us get concepts of cardinal 
numbers?21 For small nonzero cardinal numbers, our experiences of 
counting would be a natural first call. But one has to be careful here. 
MThat does counting consist in? On some definitions, counting might 
prerequire concepts of cardinal numbers, in which case our acquisi- 
tion of the concepts could not be the result of counting experience. 
Let us take counting to include the one-to-one assignment of words 
in a stable order with a perceptually given set of entities. That is, to 
be a competent counter a child must obey the stable-order principle 
and the one-one principle (allowing for slips): the counting words 
must be used in the same order in different counts and they must be 
assigned one-to-one with the items being enumerated." A child who 
obeys the stable-order and one-one principles may still not know what 
counting is for. Even when a child knows that the correct answer to 
the question 'How many?' is given by the last w0r.d in the count, she 
may not understand the question as a request for the number of items 
counted.23 Experimental results show that children come to realize 
that the last word in a correct count signifies the number of the 
objects counted only after they have acquired the stable-order prin- 
ciple and the one-one principle. That is, they learn the cardinal 
significance of counting only after learning correct counting proce- 
d ~ r e . ' ~At about the same time, they come to know which cardinal 
number each word in their counting list denotes.*j I assume that in 
" It is possible that we have innate concepts of cardinals 1, 2, and 3. Experiments 
of Karen bt'ynn suggest that infants as young as five months make numerical 
predictions when numbers are limited to three-"Addition and Subtraction by 
Human Infants," ~'Vatuie,CCCL\~III (1992): 749-50. Wynn's findings have been 
replicated many times under varying conditions. On  one explailation of these 
findings, infants have genuine numerical beliefs, which have concepts for the 
cardinals 1, 2, and 3 as components. The explanation of these findings is under 
dispute, however. 
"For coullting principles, see Rochel Gelmail and Charles Gallistel, The Child's 
Understanding oj Number (Cambridge: Harvard, 1978), chapter 7. 
'Whildi-en at this stage sometimes treat a number word as a variable designator, 
like a demonstrative, taking it to refer in a given count to the item to which it is 
assigned. See Karen Fuson, Children's Counting and Concepts of Nz~n~ber (New York: 
Springer, 1988); and Wynn, "Children's Understanding of Counting," Cognition, 
XXXYI (1990): 155-93. 
"Wynn (ibid.)found that the children in her study acquire the cardinal principle 
at around the age of 3 years, after they have learned correct counting procedure. 
This is coiitrary to the understanding-before-skill hypothesis of Gelmaii and Gallis- 
tel, but accords with the reverse hypothesis of Fuson. 
' q J ynn ,  "Children's Acquisition of the Number Words and the Counting Sys- 
tem," Cognitive Psychology, x x ~ v(1992): 220-51. Wynn found that children take the 
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the process they acquire concepts for those cardinal numbers. How 
this happens is not clear. It is not improbable that part of the process 
involves mentally associating representations of initial words in the 
counting list with initial representations supplied by the sense of 
n ume r o~ i t y . ~~An additional possibility is that in learning to count we 
construct a category representation of sets of a given size, one for 
each set size from 1 to 3.27 These might then serve as representations 
of those cardinal numbers and get mapped onto the initial numer- 
osity representations. Our counting experience might also lead us to 
associate adding a further item to the set of those counted with 
proceeding from one cardinal number to the next one up in order of 
size. So our concept of cardinal 2, for example, would present it as 
the successor of 1 as well as the number between 1 and 3. Thus, 
experience of the counting procedure and of its use may feed into 
the acquisition of concepts for cardinal numbers 1, 2, and 3, and 
enable us to recognize new instances of each and discriminate them 
from instances of the neighboring cardinal numbers. In this way, we 
can have acquaintance with these numbers. 
Do we have acquaintance with cardinal numbers greater than 3? 
My inclination is to think that we do. In our experience of counting, 
we repeatedly meet and notice numbers from 4 to 10, as finger 
counting typically has an important developmental role.28 In so 
doing, we might sharpen our sense of numerosity to get senses of 
individual cardinal numbers beyond 3, just as repeatedly exercising 
number words in their list to stand for unique cardinalities before knowing which 
cardinality each one denotes. They may reach this stage through experience of the 
use of number words outside counting contexts, reaching the later stage oilly when 
they make an order-preseiring association of number words in counting sequence 
with cardinals in order of size, perhaps by some general analogizing mechanism. 
See also Fuson, "Relationships Between Counting and Cardinality from Age 2 to 
Age 8" in Jacqueline Bideaud, Claire Meljac, and Jean-Paul Fischer, eds., Pathways 
to ATumbm- (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1992), pp. 127-49. 
'"here is clinical evidence for neural links between the sites in the left hemi- 
sphere of the numerosity sense and of the aural number word store (inferior 
parietal lobe and perisylvian cortex). See Butterworth, chapter 4; and Dehaene, The  
1Vzcmber Sense, chapter 7. Presumably these links are formed when children learn the 
cardinal meanings of the number words. 
"Perhaps by "abstracting" from the nature of the elements of n-membered sets 
and the order in which the members are given, as Georg Cantor suggested, we form 
a representation of the cardi~lal number n-Contribzctions to the Founding of the  The09  
of TransJinite h'umbms I (1895), Philip E. B. Jourdain, trans. (New York: Dover 
1955), §1. This is not to endorse Cantor's view that these representations are the 
cardinal ~lumbers.  
"See Fuson, "Relationships between Counting and Cardinality from Age 2 to 
Age 8." For the neuropsychological importance of finger counting, see also But- 
tenvorth, chapter 5. 
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one's visual capacity for discriminating shades of red or types of snow 
sharpens our sense of those different properties or kinds. From 
counting experience, we get a sharpened sense of the cardinal size 4. 
Our sense of 4 may not be quite as clear and strong as our sense of 
3, but the difference may not be great. Similarly, we may develop a 
sharpened sense of subsequent numbers, each almost as clear and 
strong as our sense of its predecessor. It is possible that there is a 
relatively sudden drop in the sharpness of the sense of numerosity 
thus developed, perhaps after 10, but I am not aware of evidence for 
it. If the contrary is true, there would be no natural cut-off point 
separating those cardinals we can recognize and those we can only 
detect; consequently, acquaintance with cardinals would have to be a 
matter of degree. But there is no ground for worry here, as that is 
how it is anyway for acquaintance with material individuals. 
111. ICUO\\'LEDGE OF CARDINAL NUMBERS BY DESCRIPTION 
Small numbers beyond 3 may be known by acquaintance. But even if 
they are not, they are known by description through familiarity with 
small number addition. The cardinal number 5, for example, may be 
known as the size of a set composed of a triple and a pair (without 
repetition or overlap). Clearly, all the numbers from 4 to 10 can be 
easily and briefly described this way without assuming knowledge of 
cardinal numbers beyond 3. Early addition exercises performed us- 
ing counting techniques give us knowledge of all two-addend cardinal 
sums with totals up to and including 10.'"hus, for each number 
from 4 up to 10 there are several descriptions of this sort (sum of 
cardinal x and cardinal g) by which we know it; and we have more of 
these descriptions for larger numbers, so that our richer descriptive 
knowledge of larger numbers makes up for our weaker direct sense of 
them.30 
This kind of knowledge takes us up to 10, perhaps to 20, perhaps 
even to 100. MThat about knowledge of much larger numbers? There 
are many possibilities, but probably just a few basic kinds of descrip- 
tion that most of us use.31 As multidigit numerals (in the decimal 
'"or a developmental account, see Fuson, "Relationships betweell Cou~ i t i~ lg  and 
Cardinality from Age 2 to Age 8." 
30 The cardinal number 0 may (must?) be known by description-for example, 
the number of wild tigers in Scotland, the result of taking away two things from a 
set of two. Perhaps one does not think of '0' as naming a cardinal number (rather 
than an indicator of absence) ahead of accepting that there is an empty set. I do  not 
know of empirical work 011 this question. 
31 I have in mind people who are not calculating prodigies but have a level of 
schooling in arithmetic that is standard in North America and Europe. I am not 
suggesting that this standard is very good or better than standards else~vliere. 
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place system) play such a big role in numerical thinking, it is natural 
to look to them for clues. An obvious thought is that a multidigit 
numeral is short for the corresponding polynomial description: the 
cardinal 2'71 is the cardinal of a set composed of 2 hundreds, '7 tens, 
and 1 one. This seems plausible and can clearly be extended using 
greater powers of ten. But we would need to say how we know of 
those powers of ten. This is easy for the case of a hundred, which is 
thought of as a set of 10 tens. But for higher powers the question 
arises whether our knowledge of the cardinal number really depends 
on its description in terms of powers. Do we think of the cardinal 
2,710,003 as the cardinal of a set composed of 2 tens-to-the-power-of- 
six, 7 tens-to-the-power-of-five, and so on? Do we not first think of a 
ten-to-the-power-of-six as the number of things denoted by a '1' 
followed by six 'O's? The actual story may be quite complicated. But 
whatever it is, we clearly coz~ldcome to know cardinal numbers 
beyond 10 under the polynomial description, using a recursive defi- 
nition for powers of ten: a ten-to-the-power-of-two is 10 tens; a ten- 
to-the-power-of-n+ 1 is 10 tens-to-the-power-of-n. 
On the suggestion just made, we know larger numbers under their 
descriptions as polynomials, with multidigit numerals serving as the 
descriptive expressions. There is an alternative, in which the multi- 
digit numerals play a more intimate part in our knowledge of num- 
bers: the numerals are not merely the carriers of the description but 
are part of the descriptive content. How is this going to avoid circu- 
larity? If we think of the number 27176 as the number denoted by 
'2'7176', that cannot be the whole story. Through our knowledge of 
an algorithm for determining the numeral immediately preceding 
any given multidigit numeral and our possession of a concept for the 
cardinal successor function, we can amplify as follows: the number 
denoted by '27176' is the cardinal successor of the number denoted 
by the numeral predecessor of '27176'. Of course, this works only for 
someone who has knowledge of the number denoted by '271'75'. But 
the same kind of description is available, using the following general 
schema: the number denoted by a multidigit numeral /,I, is the cardi- 
nal successor of the number denoted by the numeral predecessor of 
/,I,. Repeated application brings us back to single-digit numerals 
whose denotation we know by direct association with cardinals with 
which we are acquainted. In this way, circularity is replaced by 
recursiveness. I am not suggesting that we actually run back in 
thought from a multidigit numeral '27176' to single digits in thinking 
of the number it denotes. We just think of the number as the number 
denoted by '27176'; but our understanding of this descriptioii (in 
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terms of numeral predecessor and cardinal successor functions) suf- 
fices to fix its reference. That is an alternative pos~ib i l i ty .~~ 
Probably the actual way in which we think of multidigit numbers is 
more complicated than either of the two suggestions made here, 
perhaps involving a mixture: the polynomial description for numbers 
of avo to four digits and the apparently circular description in terms 
of numerals for larger numbers. Even this is liable to be an oversim- 
plification, as it ignores how natural-language expressions for larger 
numbers affect how we think of them. On top of this there will be 
variations among people and over time. But my aim here is not to 
give "the correct account" of our knowledge of numbers by descrip- 
tion. It is merely to show that such an account is possible without 
positing powers that could not be countenanced in cognitive science. 
IV. 1CUOT.VING THE OBJECTS OF PURE NUMBER THEORY 
Even if my case for the possibility of a naturalistic account of knowing 
cardinals is accepted, one might protest that we still lack a parallel 
case for the objects of number theory. Those objects are not set sizes; 
they are, if anything, positions in the natural number structure.33 I 
am sympathetic to this view. Pure mathematicians at work in number 
theory are not concerned with finite cardinals as opposed to finite 
ordinals and the myriad other systems that exemplify this structure; 
they are concerned with the structure itself. Hence numerals and 
variables in the context of pure number theory are used to refer to 
(or range over) positions in the structure. But how could anyone 
have knowledge of such highly abstract objects, positions in a struc- 
ture? 
Although it lies beyond the scope of this paper to answer this 
question in any detail, I think an outline is possible. First, we would 
have to have knowledge of the structure itself. Assuming that we 
cannot have acquaintance with more than a finite portion of an 
infinite structure, knowledge of the structure must be knowledge by 
description, a description whose components are inferred from other 
kriowledge. One possibility is that we derive a description of the 
natural-number structure from our knowledge of the system of nu- 
32 Neither of these accounts is intended to show how we might know all finite 
cardinals. That would be impossible, as there is a finite upper bound on the 
number of possible neural states, llellce on the number of representatioils (sensory 
or  descriptive) that the mind call grasp. 
33 More than one structure may be described as "the" natural-number structure, 
depending on the relatiolls considered. For simplicity, we can take the sole relatioil 
to be tlie less-than relation. For structuralist views of tlie ontology of pure matlie- 
matics, see Stewart Shapiro, Pl~i loso /~ l~~ofMnthenlntics (NewYork: Oxford, 1997), part 
11; and Resnik, part 111. 
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merals in order of precedence, which is one of the systems having 
that structure. I assume that we are acquainted with some numerals 
(types, not tokens) and that we know about the system as a whole 
through our knowledge of algorithms for constructing the successor 
and predecessor of a given numeral, and for addition on the numer- 
als. Writing I K I  for the number of predecessors of numeral K , ~ ~  p + 
K is the numeral constructed by I K I  applications of the successor 
operation starting from numeral p.  Precedence is understood in the 
familiar way: p CL v if and only if for some K other than 'O' ,  p + K = 
v. Through standard arguments we know that the order of prece- 
dence is a strict total ordering having just one element that is not a 
successor and no element that is not a predecessor. In fact, it is a well 
ordering, because from any numeral p one can reach '0'by IpI 
applications of the predecessor operation, and so there is no unend- 
ing sequence of ever earlier numerals; hence every nonempty set of 
numerals has an earliest member. With this knowledge of the struc- 
ture, as a well-ordering with one position and no terminal 
position, we can know a position as the nthposition of the structure. 
For any numeral not too long to be grasped, we can know and name 
the position that it occupies and all preceding positions. 
That is my outline. I concede that we are still some way off from 
being able to fill in the cognitive details of a naturalistic account of 
our knowledge of the natural-number structure, hence of its posi- 
tions. But I am aware of no reason to think that future developments 
in the empirical study of our cognitive capacities will not one day 
provide the resources for a full account along the lines of the sketch 
just given. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Among philosophical attitudes to arithmetic prevalent today is a kind 
of skepticism: the theorems of arithmetic are not true, unless they are 
interpreted in one or another strange way. One of the main motiva- 
tions for this attitude is the conviction that there could not be a 
naturalistic mode of knowing numbers. I have tried here to rebut that 
conviction. Drawing on recent work in cognitive science, I have 
sketched ways in which we might have knowledge of cardinal num- 
bers. I have not canvassed all the possibilities, and it may be that none 
of those presented here are right. My claim is only that they, or 
something similar, could be right; so, I conclude, we should not 
3'4 I assume that '0' is the first numeral. So / K /  is the cardinal denotation of K.  
35 This terminology is slightly misleading. Pi11 initial position is one that is not the 
successor of another position. So the position of any limit ordinal is initial (as is the 
position of 0). 
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dismiss the very possibility of explaining knowledge of cardinal num- 
bers within a scientific framework. 
Maat has prevented people from seeing the kind of possibilities 
outlined here? There are probably several obstacles. Here are my 
suggestions. One has to do with the word 'object'. If cardinal num- 
bers exist, they are objects, we say. That dictum is a truism if the word 
'object' is used to mean 'entity'. But cardinal numbers, being prop- 
erties of sets, are very unlike prototypical objects, which are bounded, 
perceptible, spatiotemporal continuants. Moreover, the word 'object' 
is often used contrastively with 'property'. So the dictum may obscure 
the fact that cardinal numbers are properties and incline one to think 
that, if there were such things as cardinal numbers, they would have 
to be something like disembodied billiard balls. A second obstacle 
may be a nominalist reluctance to accept the existence of properties. 
A third obstacle may be that the empirical study of cognitive capac- 
ities for number knowledge is relatively young-though it is now a 
vibrant research subject. Finally, philosophers of mathematics have 
shown a near total disregard for the empirical findings, despite a 
willingness to pronounce on cognitive matters.36 I hope that this 
paper shows the merit of abandoning that attitude. 
MARCUS GWQUINTO 
University College London 
3% iiotable case is Philip I(itc11er's claim that children come to learn the 
meaning of 'number' and to accept basic truths of arithmetic "by engaging in 
activities of collectillg and segregatingn-The h'ccture of~~lathematicalKnowledge (New 
York: Oxford, 1984), chapter 6. Kitcher gives no reference to empirical work on 
children's cognitive development, and his view is not borne out by the findings 
earlier published in Gelman and Gallistel. 
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